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Highlights
• We consider a reference dependent and a mean preserving newsvendor
model
• We discuss heterogeneous and asymmetric ordering behavior
• We relate behavioral parameters to standardized Pull-to-Center effects
• We propose an endogenous approach to analyze the applicability of the
models
• The two models cover the whole area of plausible order quantity com-
binations
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Abstract
In this paper we analyze heterogeneity and asymmetry of ordering behavior in high-profit
and low-profit product settings as well as applicability of the reference dependent newsven-
dor model with different psychological costs of overordering and underordering. Further, we
introduce a mean preserving newsvendor model by extending the overconfident newsven-
dor model to non-negative confidence parameters. For these models we provide simple
and intuitive conditions on the operational and behavioral parameters that allow hetero-
geneity and asymmetry of ordering. We relate the psychological cost parameters of the
reference dependent newsvendor model to the confidence parameters of the mean preserv-
ing model. Because of heterogeneity in ordering, the descriptive order quantities of an
individual are not necessarily compatible with admissible behavioral parameter values of
the model under consideration. Therefore, we use an endogenous approach to derive the
behavioral parameter values from the descriptive order quantities, if possible. For the ref-
erence dependent newsvendor model, this approach enables us to derive constraints of the
descriptive order quantities that guarantee admissible and realistic values of the psycho-
logical cost parameters. We give managerial interpretations of the analytical findings by
a graphical illustration; the two behavioral models cover the whole area of plausible order
quantity combinations for the low-profit and high-profit product. We discuss how an exec-
utive inventory manager could advice the newsvendor to adapt the behavioral parameters
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in order to achieve an expected profit target.
Keywords: Inventory, Behavioral Newsvendor, Heterogeneity, Asymmetry, Applicability
1. Introduction
It has been frequently recognized that the actual ordering behavior deviates from the
order quantities prescribed by standard inventory models. For the single period newsvendor
model in experiments the so-called pull-to-center (PtC) effect has been observed at an
aggregate level: The average order quantity of the participating individuals is in the PtC
range, i.e. between expected demand and expected profit maximizing order quantity. For a
recent survey on newsvendor experiments we refer to Becker-Peth and Thonemann (2019).
However, the results of experiments showed heterogeneity in ordering behavior: For a
specific product some individuals show the PtC effect whereas others order outside the
PtC range. Moreover, a group of individuals exhibits the PtC effect for both high-profit
and low-profit products (see e.g. Lau et al. (2014)). Uppari and Hasija (2019) state that
the standard expected profit maximizing newsvendor model and some other models do
not exhibit heterogeneity in ordering. These authors present prospect theory newsvendor
models that accommodate heterogeneity in order quantities. For example, in the model
of Long and Nasiry (2015) heterogeneity depends on special technical parameter relations
(see Proposition 1 in Uppari and Hasija (2019)).
Moreover, asymmetric ordering behavior between symmetric high-profit and low-profit
products expressed by the standardized PtC effect can be observed, i.e. the distances of
the order quantity from expected demand are significantly different for these product types
(see Zhang and Siemsen (2019), Table 2). Consequently, behavioral newsvendor models
being in accordance with findings from experiments should be able to explain the PtC
effect at the aggregate level as well as heterogeneous ordering behavior and, in addition,
asymmetry in order quantities between low-profit and high-profit products (Uppari and
Hasija (2019), Kirshner and Ovchinnikov (2018), Kirshner and Shao (2018), Zhang and
Siemsen (2019)).
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Because of the heterogeneous ordering behavior the descriptive order quantities of an
individual are not necessarily compatible with admissible values of the behavioral parame-
ters of the considered newsvendor model. We propose an endogenous approach to explore
for behavioral newsvendor models the admissible space of the descriptive order quantities:
If possible, we derive the behavioral parameter values from the descriptive order quantities
of an individual.
Using the classification of Cui and Wu (2018), we discuss heterogeneity as well as
asymmetry in ordering behavior for the reference-dependent newsvendor model by Ho et
al. (2010), a newsvendor model with non-standard preferences. We also discuss the mean
preserving newsvendor model, a model with non-standard beliefs where the newsvendor’s
judgment may exhibit either overconfident or underconfident behavior (Gerchak and Moss-
man (1992), Ren and Croson (2013)). To date the basic models by Ho et al. (2010) as
well as Ren and Croson (2013) have been applied and extended in many ways. E.g., the
recent paper by Li et al. (2021) on ’Transshipment Between Overconfident Newsvendors’
starts with a quote from the Nobel laureate Richard Thaler ’Consider...the most important
concepts of behavioral economics: overconfidence...’; we also refer to the recent paper by
Bai et al. (2021). The reference dependent model is a natural extension of stockout-averse,
waste-averse and minimizing ex-post inventory error models (see Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000)). In contrast to other related behavioral papers, for the two considered models
simple and intuitive conditions allow to explain heterogeneity and asymmetry of ordering.
Ho et al. (2010) generalize the model with preference for minimizing the ex-post inven-
tory error by assuming different psychological costs for stockouts and leftovers, respectively.
This difference in the psychological costs allows asymmetric ordering (Ho et al. (2010),
Proposition 2). We correct and complete the conditions such that order quantities are in
the PtC range. With these conditions, we are able to show that the newsvendor model
with different psychological costs fulfills heterogeneity and can exhibit the PtC effect at the
aggregate level. Therefore, the model of Ho et al. (2010) principally can explain ordering
behavior of newsvendors.
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Moreover, we demonstrate the applicability of the reference-dependent newsvendor
model, by providing conditions such that admissible values of the psychological cost pa-
rameters exist. If the order quantity of the high-profit product is larger than that of the
low-profit product the reference dependent model might be infeasible. We represent the
analytical findings by a graphical illustration of the admissible area of the order quanti-
ties; there we also show the area where the psychological costs of underordering are larger
(smaller) than that of overordering. In addition, a small difference of the individual descrip-
tive order quantities of the high-profit and the low-profit product results in implausibly
high values of the psychological cost parameters compared to the operational parameters
(e.g. the selling price).
In the mean preserving newsvendor model overconfidence is represented by a mean pre-
serving spread of random demand where the mean demand is fixed and the newsvendor’s
estimate of demand variance is smaller as the true variance. In case of overconfidence
only ordering in the PtC range can be characterized (Ren and Croson (2013), Ren et al.
(2017)). Contrary, underconfidence is represented by a mean preserving spread with de-
mand variance overestimation (Gerchak and Mossman (1992)). Therefore, heterogeneous
ordering behavior can be characterized for this generalization of the overconfident newsven-
dor model. In the mean preserving model for the low-profit (high-profit) product an order
quantity above (below) mean demand would result in negative confidence parameters. We
explain asymmetric ordering behavior by the difference of the confidence parameters for
the high-profit and the low-profit product.
We are interested in the relationship of the parameters between the model with non-
standard preferences and the model with non-standard beliefs. If a reference dependent
newsvendor and a mean preserving newsvendor place the same descriptive order quantities,
then we analyze the relationship between the behavioral cost parameters (psychological
costs) and the behavioral probability parameters (confidence parameters). One result is
that a newsvendor behaves overconfident for both high-profit and low-profit products if
the difference between psychological costs of underordering and overordering is relatively
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small. Further, we prove that a reference dependent newsvendor whose psychological costs
of underordering is lower than the costs of overordering (i.e. the aversion to leftovers is
greater than the disutility for stockouts) behaves like an overconfident newsvendor whose
level of overprecision is higher for the high-profit product than for the symmetric low-profit
product. In addition, we use the descriptive order quantities to relate the psychological
cost parameters of the reference dependent newsvendor model to the standardized PtC
effects of the high-profit and low-profit products.
In a managerial discussion, we again use a graphical illustration to show that the two
behavioral models cover almost the whole area of order quantity combinations for the
plausible situation that the quantity of the low-profit product is smaller than that of the
high-profit product. The responsible executive inventory manager will check the ordering
behavior of a newsvendor by the total expected profit and other conflicting performance
indicators like cycle service level and probability of loss. Like in Bai et al. (2021) we
demonstrate how an executive inventory manager could motivate the newsvendor to adapt
the behavioral parameters for achieving a targeted total expected profit.
In summary, the main contributions of the paper are:
1. By correcting and extending assertions in the reference dependent newsvendor model
of Ho et al. (2010) we provide simple and intuitive conditions for the operational
and behavioral parameters of the model that allow heterogeneous and asymmetric
ordering.
2. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the descriptive order quantities to be
compatible with the reference dependent newsvendor model.
3. By extending the overconfident newsvendor model of Ren and Croson (2013) to non-
negative confidence parameters the resulting mean preserving newsvendor model also
does allow heterogeneity and asymmetry of ordering.
4. We relate the psychological cost parameters of the reference dependent newsvendor
model to the confidence parameters of the mean preserving model.
5. In a graphical illustration we show that the two behavioral models cover the whole
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area of plausible order quantity combinations for a desired profit target and we give
advice how to adapt the behavioral parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents preliminaries and notation: the
standard newsvendor model, the PtC effect for high-profit and low-profit products and
heterogeneity and asymmetry in ordering behavior. In Section 3 the reference dependent
newsvendor model is analyzed with respect to heterogeneity and asymmetry of ordering as
well as its applicability. Section 4 is devoted to the relationship of the psychological cost
parameters with the standardized PtC effects and with the confidence parameters of the
mean preserving newsvendor model. In Section 5 we provide a managerial discussion on
the analytical results. Finally, in the 6th section conclusions are drawn.
2. Preliminaries
Let X be the newsvendor’s random demand with density function f , strictly increasing
distribution function F and mean demand E(X) = µ. The per unit selling price, purchase
cost and salvage value of the newsvendor are p, c and z with p > c > z; further let
cu = p − c be the underage cost per unit and co = c − z the overage cost per unit. The
newsvendor has to decide on the order quantity q before the demand is realized. Define
ELO(q) =
∫ q
0 (q − x)f(x)dx the expected leftovers and ELS(q) =
∫∞
q (x − q)f(x)dx the
expected lost sales; then the expected profit is E(π(q,X)) = cuµ−(coELO(q)+cuELS(q)),
where π(q,X) is the random profit of the newsvendor. Hence, the expected profit is equal
to the maximum profit for a certain demand µ minus the expected mismatch costs of
overordering and underordering (Cachon and Terwiesch 2013, Chapter 13).







In our analysis we consider high-profit as well as low-profit products that are charac-
terized by the critical ratio β. The formal definition of a high-profit (low-profit) product is:
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β > (<)F (µ). If F (µ) = 0.5, which especially holds for symmetric demand distributions,
this definition reduces to the well-known condition cu > (<)co for high-profit (low-profit)
products.
2.1. Newsvendor and the Pull-to-Center Effect
Observations in practice confirmed the conjecture that an inventory manager rarely
orders the quantity that is prescribed by the optimal expected profit maximizing order
quantity in (1). For almost twenty years starting with the pioneering work of Schweitzer
and Cachon (2000) researchers conducted experiments to obtain insights in the ordering
behavior of individuals in a newsvendor environment (for a recent overview see Becker-Peth
and Thonemann (2019)). In many of these experiments the PtC effect has been identified
at an aggregate level, i.e. the average order quantity of the individuals in an experiment is
between the expected demand µ and the optimal order quantity q∗ (Lau et al. 2014). For
a high-profit product the PtC range is represented by [µ, q∗]. Contrary, for a low-profit
product the PtC range is [q∗, µ].
There are different definitions of the PtC effect in literature. In contrast to Ho et al.
(2010) we use the above commonly accepted definition, i.e. the range between the expected
profit maximizing order quantity q∗ and the expected demand µ (Lau et al. 2014). This
definition is also used in e.g. Uppari and Hasija (2019), Schweitzer and Cachon (2000),
Ren and Croson (2013) and Zhang et al. (2019).
2.2. Heterogeneity and asymmetry in ordering behavior
Studies have shown that a model should allow heterogeneity in ordering meaning that
some individuals order inside the PtC range and other individuals order outside the PtC
range. Moreover, also an individual may exhibit the PtC effect for high-profit as well as
low-profit products. This is emphasized in recent papers by Lau et al. (2014), Uppari and
Hasija (2019), Kirshner and Ovchinnikov (2018) and Kirshner and Shao (2018).
Heterogeneity in ordering is defined by the following criteria (for a formal definition we
refer to Uppari and Hasija (2019)):
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H1: For all products some individuals exhibit the PtC effect and some individuals order
outside the PtC range.
H2: Some individuals exhibit the PtC effect for both high-profit and low-profit products.
Experimental studies have also shown asymmetries of the PtC effect given through
different deviations of the order quantity from the mean demand between high-profit and
low-profit products.
Let qD,i be some descriptive order quantity for the low-profit and high-profit product
i ∈ {L,H}. Zhang and Siemsen (2019) propose the standardized PtC effect to measure





where αi measures the relative distance of the descriptive order quantity qD,i to mean
demand µ. Thus, the larger the parameter αi, the stronger is the PtC effect, i.e. the
farther away an order quantity is from the optimal order quantity. If order quantity qD,i
is in the PtC range then 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. If αi < 0 then the newsvendor overorders in the
high-profit setting and underorders in the low-profit setting. An αi > 1 value indicates
that the order quantity passes the mean demand (see also Zhang and Siemsen (2019), p.
144).
If we solve (2) for the descriptive order quantity we have
qD,i = αiµ+ (1− αi)q∗i , (3)
Note that for 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 the order quantity qD,i in (3) represents the well-known
heuristic order quantity of a mean anchor newsvendor (see Becker-Peth and Thonemann
(2019)).
Table 1 gives an overview of the corresponding αi values for all possible situations of
order quantities for low-profit and high-profit products inside, above and below the PtC
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of qD,H > q∗H and for a low-profit product there is
−q∗L
µ−q∗L
< αL < 0 in case of qD,L > µ.
Table 1: Value of standardized PtC effect αL and αh related to descriptive order quantities qD,i, i ∈ {L,H}
below, inside and above the respective PtC range.
L\H > q∗H [µ, q∗H ] < µ
< q∗L αL < 0, αH < 0 αL < 0, 0 ≤ αH ≤ 1 αL < 0, αH > 1
[q∗L, µ] 0 ≤ αL ≤ 1, αH < 0 0 ≤ αL ≤ 1, 0 ≤ αH ≤ 1 0 ≤ αL ≤ 1, αH > 1
> µ αL > 1, αH < 0 αL > 1, 0 ≤ αH ≤ 1 αL > 1, αH > 1
In experiments frequently so called symmetric high-profit and low-profit products are
considered. For symmetric demand distributions, symmetric products are defined by equal
distance of the optimal order quantity for high-profit and low-profit products q∗H and q
∗
L ,
respectively, to the mean demand, i.e. q∗H −µ = µ− q∗L. This is equivalent to βL = 1−βH ,
where βL (βH) is the critical ratio of the low-profit (high-profit) product given in (1)
with cu,L and co,L (cu,H and co,H). It especially holds for cu,H = co,L and cu,L = co,H .
Typical values for critical ratios in experiments with symmetric products are βL = 0.25
and βH = 0.75 (see Zhang and Siemsen (2019), Table 1).
For symmetric products we have: αH > αL is equivalent to qD,H − µ < µ− qD,L.
3. Reference dependent newsvendor model with psychological costs
In this section we discuss an extension of the classical newsvendor model with non-
standard preferences (see Cui and Wu (2019)) that uses psychological costs of underorder-
ing and overordering in addition to cu and co. We present simple and intuitive conditions
for heterogeneity and asymmetry of ordering. Furthermore, we discuss the applicability of
the model.
3.1. Characteristics of the optimal order quantity
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) show theoretically as well as by means of experiments
that minimizing the ex-post inventory error is in alignment with the PtC effect. There
the realized demand X = x is used as reference point to distinguish between real losses
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(overordering) and opportunity losses (underordering) by adding identical psychological
costs of underordering and overordering. Ho et al. (2010) generalize the newsvendor model
with minimizing ex-post inventory error by allowing different psychological costs per unit of
underordering δu ≥ 0 and overordering δo ≥ 0. The resulting objective function is given by
the expected profit E(πR(q,X)) = cuµ−(coELO(q)+cuELS(q))−(δoELO(q)+δuELS(q)),
where πR(q,X) is the random profit of the reference dependent newsvendor, also called
’(δo, δu)-newsvendor’.
E(π(q,X)) and E(πR(q,X)) have a similar structure; E(πR(q,X))+ δuµ would be the
expected profit of a product with selling price p′ = p + δu + δo, purchase cost c′ = c + δo
and salvage value z′ = z resulting in underage cost cu + δu and overage cost co + δo. Since
the difference to E(πR(q,X)) is just the constant δuµ the optimal order quantity q∗R is of
a similar structure as (1) and given by
F (q∗R) =
p− c+ δu
p− z + δu + δo
=
cu + δu
cu + co + δu + δo
=: βR. (4)
As easily can be seen βR is increasing in δu and decreasing in δo.
The following Lemma 1 gives general conditions for the optimal order quantity q∗R of
the (δo, δu)-newsvendor being in the PtC range defined in Section 2.1. We correct the lower
and upper bounds (8) and (9) in Proposition 1 of Ho et al. (2010); these corrections lead




Lemma 1. For the optimal order quantities q∗R and q
∗ given by (4) and (1) we have:
a) q∗R ∈ [µ, q∗] if and only if δuδo ≤
cu
co
and (cu + δu)(1− F (µ)) ≥ (co + δo)F (µ),
b) q∗R ∈ [q∗, µ] if and only if δuδo ≥
cu
co
and (cu + δu)(1− F (µ)) ≤ (co + δo)F (µ),
c) q∗R = q




Proof. In a) q∗R ∈ [µ, q∗] is equivalent to β ≥ βR ≥ F (µ). Using (1) and (4) the
assertion follows. b) and c) can be shown analogously.
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For z = 0 Lemma 1 a) and b) are also proved in Proposition 2 and 3 in Zhang et al.
(2019) for their special case of no strategic customers and random demand with increasing
generalized failure rate. Whereas Ho et al. (2010) assume normally distributed demand,
Lemma 1 holds for general continuous demand distributions.
It is evident that the conditions in Lemma 1 a) correspond to a high-profit product
and in Lemma 1 b) to a low-profit product. From the conditions in Lemma 1 c) we see
that q∗R = q
∗ not only holds for zero psychological costs.
These simple and intuitive conditions in Lemma 1 offer very clear characterizations
how behavioral parameters (δu, δo) and operational parameters (cu, co) interact. For a
high-profit product Lemma 1 a) states that the order quantity q∗R equals q
∗ if the ratio
of the psychological costs per unit of underordering and overordering δuδo is equal to the
ratio of the corresponding operational costs per unit cuco . Furthermore, the order quantity
q∗R equals µ if the expected operational and behavioral costs per unit of underordering
(cu + δu)(1 − F (µ)) is equal to the expected operational and behavioral costs per unit of
overordering (co + δo)F (µ). This condition is of the same structure as the marginal cost
analysis for determining the optimal order quantity in newsvendor models (see (1) and
(4)).
In Corollary 1 we consider the special case of a symmetric demand distribution, imply-
ing F (µ) = 0.5, and give conditions for q∗R to be inside the PtC range.
Corollary 1. For symmetric demand distributions we have for q∗ given by (1) and q∗R
given by (4):
a) If δo > δu ≥ 0:
i) q∗R ∈ [µ, q∗] if and only if δo − δu ≤ cu − co,




b) If δu > δo ≥ 0:





         
ii) q∗R ∈ [q∗, µ] if and only if δu − δo ≤ co − cu.
c) If δu = δo then q∗R in any case is inside the PtC range for the respective product.
Proof. a) i) β ≥ 0.5 is equivalent to cu ≥ co. Because δo ≥ δu the first condition
of Lemma 1 a) is satisfied. ii) β ≤ 0.5 is equivalent to cu ≤ co. Because δo ≥ δu the
second condition of Lemma 1 b) is satisfied. b) is proven similarly. c) If δu = δo then the
conditions of Lemma 1 a) and b) are fulfilled.
Note that Corollary 1 c) describes the newsvendor with preferences for minimizing ex-
post inventory error; there the newsvendor’s order quantity in any case is inside the PtC
range (see Schweitzer and Cachon , 2000, Theorem 5).
We illustrate Corollary 1 with the respective lower and upper bounds of the PtC range
for low-profit and high-profit products in Figure 1. The shaded area in Figure 1 represents
those values of δu and δo where the newsvendor orders within the PtC range. The psy-
chological costs δu and δo are common across both profit conditions (see Ho et al., 2010,































































Figure 1: Illustration of area with orders in the PtC range (shaded area).
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3.2. Heterogeneity and asymmetry in ordering of the reference dependent newsvendor
A consequence of Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 a) and b) is that the order quantity q∗R of
the (δo, δu)-newsvendor not necessarily fulfills the PtC effect.
In the following we discuss the validity of heterogeneity criteria H1 and H2 (see Section
2.2).
Proposition 1. For (δo, δu)-newsvendors with δo > 0, δu > 0 and δo 6= δu heterogeneity
criteria H1 and H2 are fulfilled.
Proof. The assertion follows from Lemma 1.
From Figure 1 it is immediately evident that the assertions in Corollary 2 are satisfied.
Corollary 2. a) A stockout-averse newsvendors, i.e. δu > 0 and δo = 0, always
overorders, therefore heterogeneity criterion H1 is fulfilled for low-profit products only.
b) A waste-averse newsvendors, i.e. δo > 0 and δu = 0, always underorders, therefore
heterogeneity criterion H1 is fulfilled for high-profit products only.
c) A newsvendors with preferences to minimize ex-post inventory error, i.e. δo = δu,
always orders inside the PtC range, therefore heterogeneity criterion H1 is not fulfilled
for both products.
For symmetric demand distributions in Figure 2 the assertions of Proposition 1 and
Corollary 2 are represented in a graphical manner. From Figure 2 we can conclude that
for (δo, δu) ∈ A ∪ B the orders for both low-profit and high-profit product are in the PtC
range and consequently heterogeneity criterion H2 is fulfilled. Contrary, for (δo, δu) ∈
G ∪ E ∪ D ∪ H the newsvendor orders outside the PtC range for the low-profit product
and for (δo, δu) ∈ C ∪ G ∪ H ∪ F the newsvendor orders outside the PtC range for the
high-profit product. Thus, heterogeneity criterion H1 is fulfilled.
For the special case of stockout-averse newsvendors with δu > 0 and δo = 0 the order
quantity q∗R is always higher than q
∗ meaning that for a high-profit product it is outside
the PtC range (see Lemma 1). For a low-profit product q∗R is inside the PtC range provided
13









































Figure 2: Validity of the heterogeneity criteria for a reference dependent newsvendor in the (δo, δu)-
plane for symmetric demand distributions.
δu ≤ co,L − cu,L. Thus, for a stockout-averse newsvendor heterogeneity criterion H1 can
only be valid for low-profit products whereas H2 is violated.
Waste-averse newsvendors with δo > 0 and δu = 0 violate the PtC effect for all low-
profit products such that criterion H2 is never satisfied. From Corollary 1 a), for a high-
profit product q∗R is inside the PtC range if δo ≤ cu,H − co,H holds. Therefore, the waste-
averse newsvendor fulfills heterogeneity criterion H1 only for high-profit products.
If (δo, δu)-newsvendors’ preferences are to minimize the ex-post inventory error, i.e.
δu = δo, then because of Corollary 1 c) the order quantity q∗R is never outside the PtC
range meaning that criterion H2 holds for all individuals for both high-profit and low-profit
products and consequently the PtC effect is also fulfilled at the aggregate level. Of course,
criterion H1 is violated.
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Hence, only reference-dependent newsvendors with different positive psychological costs
of underordering and overordering, i.e. δu 6= δo, fulfil both heterogeneity criteria: Orders
inside and outside the PtC range are possible. Further, some individuals order in accor-
dance with the PtC effect for both high-profit and low-profit products.
For the reference dependent newsvendor model asymmetric ordering behavior crucially
depends on the relationship of psychological costs δu and δo. The PtC effect for the high-
profit product is stronger than for the low-profit product if and only if δo > δu > 0 (see
Proposition 2 in Ho et al. (2010) for normally distributed demand and Proposition 4 in
Zhang et al. (2019) in case of strategic costumers for symmetric demands with increasing
generalized failure rate). We will show in Section 4 that the above assertion on asymmetric
ordering behavior is valid for general symmetric demand distributions.
3.3. Applicability of the reference dependent newsvendor
Table 2 describes the ranges of descriptive order quantities qD,L and qD,H compatible
with the (δo, δu)-newsvendor (see Figure 2).
Table 2: Order quantities qD,L and qD,H below, inside or above the respective PtC range related to a
(δo, δu)-newsvendor based on Figure 2.
L\H > q∗H [µ, q∗H ] < µ
< q∗L − D H
[q∗L, µ] C A ∪B F
> µ G E −
The bar lines in Table 2 indicate that there are order quantities for any low-profit and
high-profit product which cannot be expressed by the (δo, δu)-newsvendor. This is the case
when the order quantity of the high-profit product is larger than q∗H and the order quantity
of the low-profit product is lower than q∗L or when the order quantity of the high-profit
product is lower than µ and the order quantity of the low-profit product is larger than µ.
In the following Propositions 2 and 3 we discuss whether order quantities qD,L and
qD,H are related to a (δo, δu)-newsvendor for symmetric products.
15
         
Proposition 2. Let q∗R,H and q
∗
R,L be given in (4) for a high-profit and low-profit product of
a (δo, δu)-newsvendor. Then for symmetric demand distributions and symmetric products
with cu,H = co,L and co,H = cu,L, we have q∗R,H > q
∗
R,L.
Proof. By (4) q∗R,H > q
∗
R,L is equivalent to βR,H > βR,L. For δu ≥ 0 and δo ≥ 0 this is
equivalent to δo(cu,H − cu,L) + δu(co,L − co,H) > cu,Lco,H − co,Lcu,H . The right hand side
of this inequality is negative. Hence, δu ≥ 0 and δo ≥ 0 insures the inequality.
From Proposition 2 the following necessary condition follows.
Corollary 3. Let descriptive order quantities qD,H and qD,L be given for a high-profit
and low-profit product and let qD,H ≤ qD,L. Then for symmetric demand distributions
and symmetric products the decision maker cannot be represented by a (δo, δu)-newsvendor
since δu and δo must be non-negative.
Next, we discuss for the plausible situation qD,H > qD,L when a (δo, δu)-newsvendor
exists. The following Lemma 2 presents formulas for the psychological costs δu and δo as
well as monotonicity properties.
Lemma 2. Let descriptive order quantities qD,H and qD,L be given for a high-profit and
low-profit product and let qD,H > qD,L. Replacing in (4) the optimal order quantity q∗R of
the reference dependent newsvendor by the descriptive order quantities qD,H and qD,L, then




F (qD,H)−F (qD,L) and δo =
(1−F (qD,H))cu,H−(1−F (qD,L))co,H
F (qD,H)−F (qD,L) ,
b) δu and δo are decreasing (increasing) in qD,H (qD,L).
Proof. Using (4) a) is obtained by solving the system of 2 equations with F (qD,H) and
F (qD,L) on the left-hand side. b) The monotonicity results follow from the first derivatives
of δu and δo wrt F (qD,H) and F (qD,L).
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Proposition 3. Let descriptive order quantities qD,H and qD,L be given for a high-profit
and low-profit product and let qD,H > qD,L. Then we have for symmetric demand distribu-
tions and symmetric products with cu,H = co,L and co,H = cu,L:
Descriptive order quantities qD,H and qD,L represent a (δo, δu)-newsvendor, i.e. there are






Furthermore, F (qD,H) > (=, <)1− F (qD,L) is equivalent to δu > (=, <)δo.
Proof. Because qD,H > qD,L there is F (qD,H) > F (qD,L). δu and δo are given by Lemma
2 a). Then the assertions immediately follow.
Corollary 4. With the assumptions of Proposition 3 let the descriptive order quantities
qD,H and qD,L be in the respective PtC range, i.e. qD,H ∈ [µ, q∗H ] and qD,L ∈ [q∗L, µ]. Then
this ordering behavior can be represented by a (δo, δu)-newsvendor.
Note that for the special case qD,H = q∗H and qD,L = q
∗
L there is δu = δo = 0 which
represents the standard newsvendor.
From the equations of the psychological costs δu and δo given in Lemma 2 a) it can
be immediately seen that no positive psychological costs exist if the numerators in these
equations are negative. On the other hand, the psychological costs may be implausibly
high if qD,H is only slightly higher than qD,L (see denominators in Lemma 2 a)).
Figure 3 visualizes our analytical results on the reference dependent newsvendor model.
From Corollary 3 we know that in case of qD,H ≤ qD,L the inventory manager cannot be
represented by a reference dependent newvendor. For order quantities qD,L and qD,H inside
the triangle the reference dependent newsvendor model is suitable for explaining ordering
behavior, i.e. qD,i = q∗R,i, i ∈ {L,H} (see Lemma 2). In Figure 3 we also illustrate the three
special cases (1) waste-aversion δu = 0, (2) stockout aversion δo = 0 and (3) minimizing
ex-post inventory error δu = δo (see Corollary 2).
In particular, we see that F (q∗R,H) = 1 − F (q∗R,L) implies δu = δo (see Proposition
3). Furthermore, δo > (<) δu whenever the in-stock probability of the high-profit order
quantity F (q∗R,H) is smaller (larger) than the stock-out probability of the low-profit order
17
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Figure 3: Illustration of conditions in Proposition 3: descriptive order quantities qD,H and qD,L
(qD,H > qD,L) in accordance with the reference dependent newsvendor model for symmetric prod-
ucts (βL = 1 − βH) and F (µ) = 0.5 (dashed-dotted square representing orders inside the PtC
range).
quantity 1− F (q∗R,L).
From Figure 2 we see that δu and δo is unbounded if (δu, δo) /∈ C ∪D. From Lemma 2
a) it is evident that the psychological cost values will be implausibly high relative to the
operational parameters (see the discussion in Gavirneni and Robinson (2017)), whenever
the order quantities in the low-profit and high-profit setting are rather close (i.e. order
quantity combinations close to the 45Âř line in Figure 3). Such ordering behavior implies
that price and cost parameters are not that crucial for the ordering decisions; the decision
maker might be biased by other factors (see the discussion in the following Sections 4 and
5).
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4. Relationship of the behavioral parameters
In this section we compare the reference dependent newsvendor model from Section 3
with the standardized PtC effect αL and αH discussed in Section 2.3. Further, we introduce
a mean preserving newsvendor model as an extension of the overconfident newsvendor
model. We discuss the cases where the behavioral models are equally suitable for modeling
newsvendor behavior.
4.1. Comparison with the standardized PtC effect
From Table 1 we see that at least one of the asymmetry parameters αL and αH is greater
than 1 if for the psychological cost parameters δo and δu we have (δo, δu) ∈ E ∪F ∪G∪H
(see Figure 2 and Table 2).
In the following Proposition 4 we characterize the general relation between the behav-
ioral parameters of the reference dependent model and the standardized PtC effect.
Proposition 4. Let q∗R,H and q
∗
R,L be given by (4) for high-profit and low-profit products,
i.e. δu ≥ 0 and δo ≥ 0 exist, and let αH and αL be such that q∗R,H = qD,H and q∗R,L =
qD,L. For symmetric demand distributions and symmetric products with cu,H = co,L and
co,H = cu,L, we have:
a) δo > δu if and only if αL < αH ,
b) δu > δo if and only if αL > αH
c) δu = δo if and only if αL = αH .
Proof. a) From (1) and (4) we know q∗H − q∗R,H > q∗R,L − q∗L (which is equivalent to
q∗R,H − µ < µ− q∗R,L) if and only if δo > δu ≥ 0. Then according to q∗R,i = qD,i, i ∈ {L,H}
which implies αi =
q∗i−q∗R,i
q∗i−µ















αL. Starting from αH > αL from the previous derivations immediately δo > δu follows. b)
and c) are proved using the same line of arguments.
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Proposition 4 explains asymmetric ordering behavior for the reference dependent newsven-
dor. E.g., if the psychological costs of overordering δo are higher than the psychological
costs of underordering δu then the PtC effect of the high-profit product is stronger than
that of the low-profit product, i.e. qD,H − µ < µ − qD,L. In Proposition 2 in Ho et al.
(2010) the demand is normally distributed and a more restrictive assumption for symmet-
ric products is used, i.e. p+ z = cH + cL, where ci, i ∈ {L,H} denotes the purchasing cost
of the respective product. Our generalizations in Proposition 4 require an alternative way
of proving.
Ho et al. (2010) and others (see Kirshner and Ovchinnikov , 2018) provide empirical
evidence that δo > δu > 0 at the aggregate level. From a theoretical point of view one
could argue that δo > δu since leftovers imply real losses whereas shortages result (only)
in opportunity losses. On the other hand shortages may imply a decline of the market
share and therefore δu > δo is plausible, too. Analyzing 24 empirical studies Zhang and
Siemsen (2019) find that the PtC effect is not consistently stronger in the high-profit
product condition, i.e. αL < αH . Therefore, from our findings in Proposition 4 we can
conclude that δo > δu > 0 is not a robust empirical phenomenon.
Proposition 5. For (δo, δu) ∈ D ∪ F ∪ H ((δo, δu) ∈ C ∪ E ∪ G) Proposition 4 a)
(Proposition 4 b) hold for any low-profit and high-profit products and demand distributions.
Proof: The general structure of Figure 2 is also valid for asymmetric demand distribu-
tion; the assertion then follows by combining Table 1 with Figure 2 and Table 2.
4.2. Comparison with the mean preserving newsvendor model
In this section we introduce the mean preserving newsvendor model; its optimal order
quantity has the structure of the heuristic order quantity (3). An extended overconfident
newsvendor model is the model of underestimating or overestimating the variance of de-
mand (Gerchak and Mossman, 1992). According to Cui and Wu (2019) this is a newsvendor
model with non-standard beliefs.
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Let X be random demand with µ = E(X) and γ ≥ 0. A mean preserving transforma-
tion of X is:
Xγ = γX + (1− γ)E(X), γ ≥ 0. (5)
In the newsvendor setting with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 the decision maker underestimates the
variance of demand, i.e. is overconfident (overprecise) and estimates the demand to be
more accurate than it truly is (Ren et al. , 2017; Gerchak and Mossman , 1992). Thereby,
1− γ represents the level of overprecision.
Gerchak and Mossman (1992) argue that it is also reasonable to let γ > 1, reflecting
an ’underconfident’ newsvendor because demand variance is overestimated. The possibility
of underconfidence is also discussed by Davis (2019). Hence, parameter γ ≥ 0 allows to
characterize both overconfident and underconfident newsvendors. We call a newsvendor
showing overconfident or underconfident behavior for the low-profit and for the high-profit
product ’mean preserving newsvendor’.
A mean preserving newsvendor is characterized by weights γH for a high-profit product
and γL for a low-profit product, respectively (see Ren et al. (2017)). Different parameters
γH and γL can explain asymmetric ordering behavior.
The optimal order quantity q∗γi for the expected profit maximizing newsvendor with
demand Xγi is (see Gerchak and Mossman (1992)):
For a high-profit product : q∗γ,H = γHq
∗
H + (1− γH)µ, γH ≥ 0. (6)
For a low-profit product : q∗γ,L = γLq
∗




The upper bound for γL in (7) assures that q∗γ,L is non-negative.
Comparing the optimal mean preserving order quantity q∗γ,i (6) and (7) with the de-
scriptive order quantity qD,i (3) we see that for γi = 1− αi both order quantities coincide
provided γi ≥ 0, i.e. αi ≤ 1.
From (6) and (7) we can again conclude that heterogeneity in ordering according to
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Uppari and Hasija (2019) is fulfilled. Heterogeneity criterion H2 is fulfilled for all individ-
uals with 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1. Heterogeneity criterion H1 is fulfilled since we consider also γi > 1
which implies an order outside the PtC range.
Table 3 presents the beliefs of a mean preserving newsvendor for all possible situations
of order quantities for high-profit as well as low-profit products demonstrating an overcon-
fident or underconfident behavior. In Table 3 the bar lines correspond to the situations
that would result in a negative confidence parameter. From (6) and (7) we see that for
a high-profit product the mean preserving newsvendor never orders less than the mean
demand µ, while the opposite holds for a low-profit product.
Table 3: Overconfident (γi ≤ 1) and underconfident (γi > 1) behavior related to optimal order quantities
of a mean preserving newsvendor for low-profit (L) and high-profit (H) products below, inside and above
the respective PtC range.
L\H > q∗H [µ, q∗H ] < µ
< q∗L γL > 1, γH > 1 γL > 1, γH ≤ 1 γL > 1,−
[q∗L, µ] γL ≤ 1, γH > 1 γL ≤ 1, γH ≤ 1 γL ≤ 1,−
> µ −, γH > 1 −, γH ≤ 1 −,−
From Tables 1, 3 and Figure 2 it is evident that the newsvendor behaves overconfident
for high-profit or low-profit products if the difference between psychological costs of under-
stocking δu and overstocking δo is not too large. This holds for (δo, δu) ∈ A∪B, where both
orders are in the PtC range (see Figure 2) and consequently overconfidence is given for
high-profit and low-profit products. Contrary, e.g. the newsvendor behaves underconfident
for high-profit products, i.e. (δo, δu) ∈ C∪G , where the psychological costs of understock-
ing δu is higher than δo, including the stockout-averse newsvendor, i.e. δu > 0 and δo = 0.
Consequently, the larger the difference of psychological costs | δu − δo | the more likely
the (δo, δu)-newsvendor cannot be represented by a mean preserving newsvendor for all
product types.








Corollary 5. In case that the confidence parameters γL and γH exist we have: δo > (<)δu
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if and only if γL > (<)γH .
Corollary 5 shows the relationship of the behavioral parameters for identical optimal
order quantities of the model with non-standard preferences and the model with non-
standard beliefs. E.g., if for a reference dependent newsvendor the psychological costs
of overordering δo are higher than the psychological costs of underordering δu then this
attitude corresponds to a mean preserving newsvendor who beliefs that demand variability
of the high-profit product is less than that of the low-profit product, i.e. γL > γH ≥ 0
holds.
5. Managerial discussion
In Section 3 and 4 we have demonstrated that the reference dependent newsvendor
model as well as the mean preserving newsvendor model are suited for heterogeneous
ordering. Building on Figure 3, in Figure 4 the upper left square shows the admissible
area of descriptive order quantities for a mean preserving newsvendor. From the figure
we see that the two models cover almost the whole area of a newsvendor’s order quantity
combinations for the low-profit and high-profit product in the plausible case of qD,H > qD,L.
Both models allow overordering as well as underordering of the high-profit and the
low-profit product. A reference dependent newsvendor represents a mixture of stockout
and waste aversion, i.e. δu > 0 and δo > 0. If the reference dependent newsvendor
overorders both products (area above the red horizontal line in Figure 4), stockout aversion
is dominating, i.e. δu > δo. If the reference dependent newsvendor underorders both
products (area left to the red vertical line in Figure 4), waste aversion is dominating,
i.e. δu < δo. In the area between the red lines including the PtC range the reference
dependent newsvendor overorders for the low-profit product and underorders for the high-
profit product including δu = δo (see Figure 3).
A mean preserving newsvendor overorders both products if the demand variance of
the low-profit product is underestimated (overconfident behavior) and the demand vari-
ance of the high-profit product is overestimated (underconfident behavior). If the demand
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variance of both products is underestimated then the high-profit (low-profit) product is















































































Figure 4: Isoquants of total expected profit for given descriptive order quantities relative to optimal
total expected profit (colored) (U(0,1) distributed demands, p = 12, cH = 3, cL = 9, z = 0) as well
as bounds of the reference dependent model (full lines), mean preserving model (dashed lines) and
PtC range (dotted-dashed lines).
For exploring the reasons of biased ordering decisions of individual newsvendors, an ex-
ecutive inventory manager could check the related overall performance typically expressed
by a set of financial as well as non-financial performance indicators. In many cases, the most
important performance measure of an executive inventory manager is total expected profit
(e.g. Bai et al. (2021)). An operative newsvendor could be biased which is reflected by
conflicting indicators: There may be a focus on avoiding stockouts in case of overordering;
a suitable indicator is the customer service measure Cycle Service Level CSL(q) = F (q).
Avoiding leftover inventory will be an explanation in case of underordering a product; an
appropriate indicator is the probability of loss PL(q) = P (π(q,X) ≤ 0) = F ((1 − β)q)
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(see e.g. Jammernegg and Kischka (2012)). CSL and PL1 are both increasing in order
quantity q.
In Table 4 we illustrate performance indicators using the example data in Figure 4 for
the lower and upper bounds of the PtC range, i.e. for the order quantity combinations
(q∗L, q
∗
H) and (µ, µ). If the newsvendor orders the mean demand µ for both products the
resulting total expected profit is 80% of the optimal total expected profit (3/3.75). For the
low-profit product CSL but also PL double, for the high-profit product PL but also CSL
reduce by 1/3.
Table 4: Performance indicators of newsvendor for order quantity q (U(0, 1) distributed demands, p =
12, cH = 3, cL = 9, z = 0).
Order q CSL(q) PL(q) E(π(q,X))
qD,L = q
∗
L 0.25 0.1875 0.375
qD,H = q
∗
H 0.75 0.1875 3.375
qD,L = µ 0.5 0.3750 0.000
qD,H = µ 0.5 0.1250 3.000
Figure 4 shows the total expected profit of a newsvendor ordering qD,L and qD,H relative
to the total optimal expected profit when ordering q∗L and q
∗
H . For an executive manager
it is evident that the ordering behavior of the reference dependent newsvendor and/or
the mean preserving newsvendor can explain any descriptive order quantity combination
resulting in a targeted total expected profit, e.g. at least 95% of the total optimal expected
profit.
If the ordering behavior of a newsvendor fails this total profit target, the executive
inventory manager could provide advice how to improve total expected profit. We illustrate
a potential procedure by three order quantity combinations A, B and C, characterized by
a relative total expected profit of 85% that should be improved to 95% (see Figure 4).
For the combination A the newsvendor overorders both products. In the setting of the
reference dependent model this is a situation where stockout aversion is dominating: CSL
1If the minimum profit is positive, instead of PL other performance measures conflicting with CSL
should be considered.
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of the high-profit and low-profit product are higher than βL and βH , but the large order
quantities also cause high PL-values. Thus, like discussed in Ho et al. (2010) the manager
could provide incentives resulting in more balanced psychological costs by reducing the
psychological costs of underordering δu and increasing that of overordering δo (see comment
following (4)), e.g. by operationalizing the psychological drivers (for an example of this
approach see experiments 2A and 2B in Ho et al. (2010), pp. 1902-1905).
In contrast, combination B characterizes the situation of underordering both products,
i.e. waste aversion is dominating. This behavior is expressed by low PL-values for both
products. On the other hand, customer service is rather poor: CSL of the low-profit prod-
uct is smaller than βL and CSL of the high-profit product is smaller than 50%. To achieve
the targeted total profit, an executive manager should influence the newsvendor’s ordering
behavior to reduce the psychological costs of overordering δo but increase psychological
costs of underordering δu.
In combination C the newsvendor underorders the high-profit product but overorders
the low-profit product. The reference dependent model and the mean preserving model are
equally suitable for describing ordering in the PtC range (Section 4). However, newsvendors
that order rather close to the mean demand in both product settings (e.g. C in Figure 4)
might be better explained by the model of overconfidence since psychological costs δu and
δo of the reference dependent newsvendor become unrealistically high (see Lemma 2 a)). In
the framework of the mean preserving model the newsvendor’s ordering behavior C shows
overconfident behavior, i.e. for both products the variance of demand is underestimated.
Consequently, CSL of the high-profit product is rather low and PL of the low-profit product
perhaps is unintentionally high. The executive manager could team-up the newsvendor
with experts from market research to improve the forecast to reduce overconfident ordering
behavior.
Our theoretical analysis on the behavioral models has also revealed that newsvendors
who order in opposite direction to the PtC range (overordering the high-profit product and
underordering the low-profit product), cannot be represented by the reference dependent
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model. They rather can be expressed by underconfident behavior where decision makers
are overestimating the demand variance (see also Table 2 and 3). Again forecasting should
be improved in order to increase total expected profit.
There are two types of newsvendors that cannot be represented by the reference de-
pendent model and the mean preserving model in case of qD,H > qD,L. The first type is
characterized by extreme overordering of both products, i.e. the only focus is high cus-
tomer service: The order quantity of the low-profit product is higher than mean demand
and the order quantity of the high-profit product is considerably higher than the optimal
quantity (the upper right triangle in Figure 4). For second type the focus is just on avoid-
ing losses by extreme underordering both products (the lower left triangle in Figure 4).
Consequently, both types represent implausible ordering behavior.
In summary, the simple and intuitive behavioral newsvendor models discussed in this
paper are not only able to predict a reasonable level of heterogeneity but also provide
guidelines to improve individual decision making.
6. Conclusion
Previous results from experiments have shown that a behavioral newsvendor model
should be able to predict the PtC effect at the aggregate level as well as heterogeneity in
ordering behavior and asymmetry in ordering between high-profit and low-profit settings.
For the reference dependent newsvendor model and for the mean preserving newsvendor
model we analytically demonstrate that simple conditions for the operational and behav-
ioral parameters exist to express heterogeneity and asymmetry in ordering. By endoge-
nously determining the behavioral parameters from descriptive order quantities we give
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of respective admissible behavioral
model parameters. We also compare the behavioral parameters, especially by deriving the
psychological cost parameters that correspond to the specific level of confidence parame-
ters. By unifying the two behavioral models cover all desirable order quantity combinations
for a newsvendor ordering a low-profit and its symmetric high-profit product. In a man-
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agerial discussion we give advice how to adapt the behavioral parameters in order to reach
a profit target.
For future research, it would be interesting to relate the individual ordering behav-
ior expressed by the reference dependent model and the mean preserving model to the
newsvendor’s (product-specific) risk preferences. For example, the risk preferences could
be related to performance targets.
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